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This paper focuses on the ways in which investment tribunals constituted under intra-EU BITs and the 
Energy Charter Treaty (in an intra-EU dispute) have reacted to the Court of Justice’s Achmea judgment of 6 
March 2018. The first part of the paper maps out the existing intra-EU arbitrations in which the issues arising 
from Achmea appear in one form or another. We then take a critical look at how the disputing parties have 
used Achmea in their argumentation and how the investment tribunals have dismissed these arguments and 
upheld their jurisdiction. The second part of the paper is analytical. When the tribunals uphold their 
jurisdiction and decide on the merits, they knowingly deliver an award, which is unenforceable in the 
Respondent State and the entirety of the EU. By drawing parallels with decisions rendered by other 
international tribunals, we argue that the rendering of potentially unenforceable awards is not specific to 
intra-EU investment disputes. We then look at why international tribunals render potentially unenforceable 
awards. The third part of the paper presents several suggestions of how intra-EU investment tribunals should 
tackle the Achmea conundrum, either by declining their jurisdiction pursuant to judicial comity or upholding 












The EU’s exercise of its post-Lisbon competences over foreign direct investment (FDI) has been 
anything but smooth.1 The difficult task of solving some of the major challenges faced by this new 
policy area reverted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice). Beyond their 
effects within the EU legal order, the rulings of the Court have very important external policy and 
legal implications. For example, in Opinion 2/152, the Court of Justice clarified the EU and EU 
Member State  competences over the EU’s new generation of free trade and investment agreements, 
which resulted in the splitting of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement(FTA) into separate trade 
and investment agreements.3 By doing so, the Court pointed out a path different than the growing 
trend of combining trade and investment chapters under one treaty roof.4 
Furthermore, in Achmea5 the Court held that investor-state arbitration clauses under 
international agreements between EU Member States, “such as” the one under the Netherlands-
Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), are precluded by EU law. This judgment will result in 
the termination of almost 200 intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)6 and the 
non-enforcement of ITA awards7 rendered under them within the EU. Similarly, the indeterminate 
wording of “such as” raises the question whether Achmea applies to intra-EU disputes under the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which would make the awards of intra-EU tribunals constituted under 
it unenforceable within the EU legal order. Whilst the European Commission (Commission) has 
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long advocated for the inapplicability of such awards due to the ECT’s “implicit disconnection 
clause”,8 the Court of Justice has yet to explicitly back this argument.  
This year, everyone was  anxiously awaiting the outcome of Opinion 1/179 - requested by 
Belgium under the insistencies of Wallonia - and whether the Investment Court System (ICS) in the 
agreement with Canada (CETA) is compatible with EU law. The Court of Justice has recently 
concluded that the ICS in CETA is compatible with EU law. Therefore, this opinion will not only 
affect the entry into force and conclusion of the EU’s trade and investment agreements with Canada, 
Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico, but it will have broader implications for the multilateral investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform process10 and the EU’s investment policy. Opinion 1/17 goes 
beyond the scope of this paper and will therefore not be discussed.  
Achmea and Opinion 1/17 are not singular cases, but form part of an established and 
ever-expanding case law of the Court of Justice on the relationship between extra-EU dispute 
settlement mechanisms (DSMs) and EU law.11 The Achmea judgment also has important practical 
implications for pending and future arbitral cases in an intra-EU context. 
This paper leaves behind the discussion on how Achmea fits into the Court’s existing case law 
on the autonomy of EU law and extra-EU DSMs12 and instead focuses on the investment arbitration 
perspective; more specifically, the ways in which  investment-treaty arbitral (ITA) tribunals have 
reacted to the Achmea ruling. Furthermore, we focus on how ITA tribunals can ameliorate the 
tensions between EU law and investment law, and not on how the political actors are to solve these 
issues, either by terminating or amending intra-EU BITs and the ECT. 
                                                 
8   See, for example, Charanne BV and Construction Investments SARL v The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No 
062/2012, Final Award, 21 January 2016, paras 223, 252, 433–439; RREEF Infrastructure (GP) Limited and 
RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sà r.l v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2016, paras 67, 81–87. 
9   CJEU, Opinion 1/17 (CETA Investment Court) ECLI:EU:C:2019:341.  
10  UNCITRAL, Working Group III, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ en/commission/working_groups/3Investor_State.html> accessed on 1 June 
2019. 
11  CJEU Opinion 1/91 (EEA I) ECLI:EU:C:1991:49; Opinion 1/92 (EEA II), ECLI:EU:C:1992:189; Opinion 
1/00 ECLI:EU:C:2002:231; Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court) ECLI:EU:C:2011:123; Opinion 2/13 
(Accession to the ECHR) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.  
12  See C Contartese and M Andenas, ‘EU autonomy and investor-state dispute settlement under inter se 
agreements between EU Member States: Achmea’ [2019] 56 CMLR 157; I J D H Pohl, ‘Intra-EU Investment 
Arbitration after the Achmea Case: Legal Autonomy Bounded by Mutual Trust?’ [2018] 14(4) European 
Constitutional Law Review 767; Sz Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘It is Not Just About Investor-State Arbitration. A Look 
at Case C-284/16, Achmea BV’ [2018] 3(1) European Papers 357.   
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The first part of the paper is descriptive and maps out the existing intra-EU arbitrations in 
which issues arising from Achmea appear in one form or another. We have covered cases that were 
pending when the Court delivered Achmea (which could either be pending or concluded at the 
moment of writing) and cases that were initiated after the Court’s ruling. This includes cases 
initiated under both intra-EU BITs and the ECT, if the latter concerns disputes between EU Member 
States. Furthermore, the analysis does not focus on domestic enforcement proceedings after the 
awards were delivered (although some are briefly mentioned) or proceedings that involve the 
annulment or rectification of awards.  
Based on the empirical data, we take a critical look at how the disputing parties have used 
Achmea in their argumentation. Our hypothesis is that the respondent EU Member States raise 
Achmea in the jurisdictional phase, as an argument against the tribunals having jurisdiction. It is 
also highly likely that the Commission intervenes as an amicus curiae or a non-disputing party. We 
then look at how the tribunals have reacted to the Achmea related arguments of the disputing parties. 
Looking at pre-Achmea arbitral cases in which the Respondent Member States unsuccessfully relied 
on EU law to argue against the tribunals’ jurisdiction, we expect that the arbitral tribunals will 
dismiss the Achmea argument based on the ground that they derive their jurisdiction from 
international investment agreements, and not from EU law. We also take account of whether arbitral 
tribunals have come up with novel reasons for dismissing the relevance of EU law to their 
jurisdiction or whether they are more inclined to follow the path established by earlier tribunals.  
The second part of the paper is analytical. If the tribunals uphold their jurisdiction and decide 
on the merits, they will knowingly deliver an award which is unenforceable in the Respondent State 
and the entirety of the EU. Drawing parallels with disputes rendered by other international tribunals, 
such as the South China Sea arbitration13 and the Arctic Sunrise dispute,14 we argue that the 
upholding of jurisdiction when tribunals render potentially unenforceable awards is not specific to 
intra-EU investment disputes. Then we discuss why might international tribunals uphold their 
jurisdiction when they render potentially unenforceable awards or decisions.  
                                                 
13  PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China), Final 
Award, 12 July 2016. 
14  ITLOS, The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v Russian Federation) Case No 22.   
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In the third part of the paper we discuss various suggestions on how intra-EU investment 
tribunals could tackle the Achmea conundrum, either by declining their jurisdiction pursuant to 
judicial comity or upholding their jurisdiction but dismissing the cases as inadmissible.  
 
2 Arbitral Tribunals Uphold Their Jurisdiction after Achmea as well  
 
In Achmea, the Court of Justice concluded that EU law - and more specifically Articles 267 and 344 
TFEU - precludes ITA provisions in international agreements concluded between EU Member 
States, such as as the ITA provisions under the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT. Due to the Court’s broad 
phrasing of “such as”– repeated several times in the judgment - commentators soon began to wonder 
whether the judgment should only apply to intra-EU BITs or to other international agreements as 
well, such as the ECT, or even BITs between EU Member States and third countries.15 In this 
section, we take the view that the wording used in Achmea is broad enough to make the judgment 
applicable to the ECT. The use of “such as” in relation to “international agreements concluded 
between Member States” does not limit the application of the judgment to BITs only, but makes the 
judgment applicable to the ECT as well, when an EU investor brings a claim against another EU 
Member State (i.e. in an intra-EU setting). In such cases, the ECT functions in the same manner as 
an intra-EU BIT.16 
As Annex 1 illustrates, at the moment of writing, there are 98 intra-EU investment arbitrations 
- brought under various intra-EU BITs, the ECT, or both – that were pending when Achmea was 
delivered or were initiated after that. Most of the cases are still pending, but in eight of them (six 
concluded and two pending) the tribunals have already discussed the implications of Achmea.  In 
the following sections, we discuss how the disputing parties have relied on the Court of Justice’s 
Achmea judgment and the ways in which the investment tribunals have reacted to these arguments. 
We will also provide a brief overview of the pre-Achmea cases (see Annex 2).   
 
                                                 
15  See n 12. 
16  For a detailed discussion of whether the Achmea judgment applies to the ECT, see Expert Declaration of 
Steffen Hindelang in Support of Respondent the Kingdom of Spain’s Motion to Dismiss and to Deny 
Confirmation of Foreign Arbitral Award in USDC for the District of Columbia, Novenergia II v Kingdom of 
Spain, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-1148. See also J Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Investment Protection and EU Law: The 
Intra- and Extra-EU Dimension of the Energy Charter Treaty’ [2012] 15 JIEL 85. 
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2.1  How do the Disputing Parties Rely on Achmea? 
Raising arguments based on EU law before an arbitral tribunal is not a novelty and by now, there is 
a certain practice of it.17 Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic,18 initiated under the Czech-Netherlands 
BIT and decided in 2004, was the first case in which the issue arose whether or not an investment 
tribunal should take into account arguments based on EU law in the jurisdictional phase of the 
dispute. The Commission sent a letter to the Czech Republic, based on which the Respondent argued 
that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction as the EU Treaties had superseded the BIT after the accession 
of the Czech Republic to the EU.19 The Tribunal rejected these arguments and upheld its 
jurisdiction. It held that there was no implicit or explicit termination of the intra-EU BIT when the 
Czech Republic acceded to the EU.20  
The years that followed saw a string of cases (see Annex 2) initiated under intra-EU BITs or 
under the ECT in an intra-EU context, in which the Respondent Member State and the Commission 
– as amicus or non-disputing party – raised objections based on EU law against the jurisdiction of 
the arbitral tribunals. Among others, the Respondents and the Commission based their arguments 
on the primacy and autonomy of EU law,21 as well as EU state aid rules.22 In the recent A11Y v 
Czech Republic, commenced under the UK-Czech BIT prior to Achmea, the Czech Republic once 
again argued that EU law had superseded the BIT following its accession to the EU, whilst the 
Claimant objected to this argument based on past cases23 dealing with this issue and pursuant to 
Articles 59 and 65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).24 The Tribunal, just 
as every other tribunal before it,25 rejected these EU law objections and upheld its jurisdiction, 
                                                 
17  See C Contartese, ‘EU law as Applicable Law in International Disputes and its Procedural Implications’, in 
M Andenas et al (eds) The EU External Action in International Economic Law. Recent Trends and 
Developments (Asser Press/Springer, forthcoming). 
18  Eastern Sugar v Czech  Republic, SCC 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007. 
19  Ibid., para 119.  
20  Ibid., paras 142-180.  
21  See, for example, Euram v Slovakia, PCA 2010-17, First Award on Jurisdiction, 22 October 2012.  
22  See, for example, Micula v Romania, ICSID ARB/05/20, Final Award, 11 December 2013.  
23  Claimant refers to RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux 
S.a.r.1. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2016, CL-130, para 
89 “the Tribunal underlines that in all published or known investment treaty cases in which the intra-EU 
objection has been invoked by the Respondent, it has been rejected”. 
24  A11Y Ltd v Czech Republic, ICSID Case No UNCT/15/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 9 February 2017, paras 
152-169. 
25  The Tribunal referencing Micula v Romania (n 22) RL-68, para 321; Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic (n 18) 
para 167; Achmea BV v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko BV v 
The Slovak Republic), Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, RL-43, paras 
244-252; Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 30 April 2010, CL-94, paras 80-85; Euram v Slovakia (n 21), paras 186-210. 
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arguing that according to both parties to the BIT, the agreement was still in force. Whilst the 
Tribunal in this case, for the sake of judicial economy, handled the EU law objection in a laconic 
fashion, other tribunals have spent considerably more time on this matter, even going so far as to 
interpret EU law, such as when the Tribunal in Euram v Slovakia interpreted Article 344 TFEU as 
not applying to intra-EU BITs.26  
Thus, one would expect that following Achmea, the Respondent Member States and the 
intervening Commission would continue objecting to the jurisdiction of the tribunals. The 
difference, however, compared to the aforementioned cases is that now the arguments have a lot 
more solid backing: the judgment of the Court of Justice. It is one thing for a member of a regional 
organization and its ‘executive’ body to argue that they view the law of the regional organization 
as precluding the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals. It is a completely different situation when the 
‘constitutional court’ of that organization – which has the ultimate authority to render binding 
interpretations of the organization’s law – holds that the jurisdiction of said arbitral tribunals is 
incompatible with the law of the organization.  
The post-Achmea cases have followed the same pattern as the pre-Achmea cases with the 
Respondent Member States challenging the tribunals’ jurisdiction on the basis of EU law and 
Achmea, while the investors use the judgment for the opposite reason. Every now and then, the 
Commission intervenes as an amicus. For example, in both Masdar v Spain and UP and CD v 
Hungary, initiated under the ECT and the France-Hungary BIT respectively, the Respondents 
requested the tribunals to interpret the ITA provisions in line with EU law, while the Claimants 
argued that Achmea was not relevant for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.27 In the pending ECT case of 
Vattenfall v Germany, the arguments differed slightly. The Respondent State and the intervening 
Commission argued that EU law was part of the applicable law; thus, Achmea was applicable to the 
ECT. The Claimant, however, argued that EU law was not part of international law and the 
applicable law, and thus Achmea was not applicable to the ECT.28  
The Respondents’ reliance on a ruling of the Court of Justice is meant to raise the importance 
of the issue and send a signal to the arbitral tribunals that not only the political actors of the EU, but 
                                                 
26  Euram v Slovakia (n 21) paras 248-267.  
27  Masdar v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/14/1, Award, 16 May 2018; UP and DC v Hungary, ICSID Case No 
ARB/13/35, Award, 9 October 2018.  
28  Vattenfall v Germany, ICSID Case No ARB/12/12, Decision on Achmea Issue, 31 August 2018.  
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the main judicial body also backs a certain interpretation. The next section, however, illustrates how 
the tribunals were not persuaded by the new arguments based on Achmea. 
 
2.2  How Do the Tribunals Respond to Achmea? 
As discussed, in the pre-Achmea cases, the arbitral tribunals always upheld their jurisdiction 
whenever the Commission or the Respondent objected to it on EU law grounds. The most 
commonly used argument was that the tribunals derive their jurisdiction from international 
agreements and not EU law, and that the EU Treaties did not supersede the intra-EU BITs. Thus, 
one would expect tribunals to use the same arguments in the post-Achmea cases as well. However, 
there is also the issue of Achmea’s applicability to the ECT. It can be expected that some ECT 
tribunals might argue that Achmea is not applicable to them as it is only applicable to intra-EU BITs. 
However, some tribunals could show greater deference to the ruling of the Court of Justice as 
opposed to the Commission’s objections. Whilst the Commission is charged with “oversee[ing] the 
application of Union law”,29 the Court of Justice is the institution that “ensure[s] that in the 
interpretation and application of the [EU] Treaties the law is observed”30 and it is the only institution 
that can provide binding interpretations of EU law.31 
This section classifies the tribunals’ responses into two groups. The first group comprises the 
cases where the tribunals agreed to dwell into the jurisdictional effects of Achmea and eventually 
rejected Achmea’s applicability to the dispute. The second group comprises the cases where the 
tribunals refused to consider Achmea as part of the jurisdictional argument, citing various 
procedural impediments. Such procedural impediments are worth evaluating against any preclusive 
effects Achmea may have on the tribunals’ jurisdiction, especially when it comes to intra-EU BIT 
cases. Indeed, one may question to what extent a late filing of a jurisdictional objection should lead 
to the same result as a timely filing, assuming that the latter would ordinarily result in a termination 
of the proceedings. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, a further delimitation deserves mention. This paper 
concerns the effects and responses to Achmea, excluding cases where the parties and the tribunals 
have ignored Achmea as part of the legal argument. An example is the afore-mentioned A11Y v 
                                                 
29  Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Article 17(1).  
30  TEU, Article 19(1). 
31  Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para 242. 
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Czech Republic arbitration in which, even though the Respondent raised EU law objections to the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it did not mention the Achmea case that was pending at that point in time. 
The Tribunal decided on the jurisdiction prior to the Achmea judgment, but rendered its final award 
after Achmea, without mentioning the judgment..32 Interestingly, the Tribunal discussed the 
termination of intra-EU BITs in the final award as well, not just in the decision on jurisdiction, and 
concluded that both parties to the BIT in question treated it as still active and valid.33 This suggests 
that tribunals will not tackle the Achmea issue proprio motu, but the disputing parties must actively 
raise it. In addition, tribunals have been continuously critical to the ‘automatic termination of BITs 
by accession to the EU’ argument, which needs to be supplemented by some active measures from 
EU Member States. 
 
2.2.1 Tribunals that Admit Achmea as a Jurisdictional Objection 
EU Member States have relied on Achmea as a jurisdictional objection. An objection must 
nevertheless follow the procedural timeline of the dispute and has to be addressed together with 
other jurisdictional arguments. Alternatively, if the proceedings have advanced beyond the 
jurisdictional stage, States may request the consideration of Achmea beyond the procedural timeline 
as a new fact or circumstance. This section reviews the responses of tribunals which have agreed to 
consider Achmea as a jurisdictional objection within or after the procedural timeline for submitting 
such objections.  
 
2.2.1.1  Achmea Does Not Apply to the ECT and Other Multilateral Treaties 
Some tribunals have decided that Achmea does not have a preclusive effect on intra-EU arbitrations 
under the ECT. This argument is gaining traction and has come to be adopted in several intra-EU 
disputes initiated pursuant to the ECT.  
One example is the Masdar v Spain award rendered under the ECT. Similarly to over three 
dozen other cases, the claim arose following the change in the regulatory framework of investments 
in solar energy in Spain. When the Court of Justice delivered the Achmea judgment, the Tribunal 
had already closed the proceedings.34 Nevertheless, the Respondent applied for the re-opening of 
                                                 
32  A11Y LTD v Czech Republic, ICSID Case No UNCT/15/1, Award, 29 June 2018. 
33  Ibid., paras 174–178. 




the proceedings under Article 38(2) of the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, which allows for 
the re-opening of proceedings under exceptional circumstances “on the ground that new evidence 
is forthcoming of such a nature as to constitute a decisive factor, or that there is a vital need for 
clarification on certain specific points”.35  
In its request, the Respondent stipulated that Achmea referred to international agreements in 
general, including the ECT, which would deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction.36 The Tribunal 
rejected the argument on two grounds. Firstly, the Achmea judgment concerned a BIT between the 
Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Therefore, it “[could not] be applied to 
multilateral treaties, such as the ECT, to which the EU itself is a party.”37 Secondly, with regard to 
the ECT, the Tribunal referred to the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet who had not seen the 
“slightest suspicion that it might be incompatible [with the TEU and TFEU].”38 The Tribunal then 
referred to the silence of the Court of Justice on the matter of the ECT’s compatibility with EU law 
and adopted the position of the Advocate General.39 One may add that the Tribunal’s reliance on 
the latter brings back the questions of power distribution and authoritative interpretations within the 
EU legal order. It follows that the three different bodies: the Commission, the Advocate General 
and the CJEU, may manifest different positions, creating contradictory reliance expectations for 
third parties. 
The most profound discussion on the role of Achmea happened in another oft-discussed case, 
Vattenfall v Germany (II), which remains pending at the moment of writing. The Tribunal responded 
to the Achmea objection in a separate 74-page long decision, discussing a long range of issues from 
the history of the ECT’s adoption to questions concerning the enforceability of arbitral awards.40 
Firstly, the Tribunal agreed with the Respondent that the rendering of the Achmea judgment 
amounted to a timely-lodged jurisdictional objection under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41.41 The 
discussion that followed concerned the compatibility of the ECT with the EU legal order. The 
Tribunal took international law as a common denominator, interpreting EU law as part of 
                                                 
35  Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) 2006 Rule 38(2). 
36  Masdar v Spain (n 34) para 675. 
37  Ibid., para 679. 
38  Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Delivered on 19 September 2017 in Case C‑284/16 Slowakische 
Republik v Achmea BV’ ECLI:EU:C:2017:699, para 43; Masdar v Spain (Award) (n 34) para 681. 
39  Masdar v Spain (Award) (n 34) para 682. 
40   Vattenfall v Germany, ICSID Case No ARB/12/12, Decision on Achmea Issue, 31 August 2018. 
41  Ibid., 98–107. 
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international law.42 Relying on the international rules of treaty interpretation, the Tribunal found no 
contradictions between the ECT and the EU legal order. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the 
expansive reading of Achmea as precluding investor-state arbitration under the ECT.43 
Later, in Foresight v Spain, an  Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) case under the ECT, 
the Tribunal first clarified that pursuant to the textual interpretation of the ECT, it had jurisdiction.44 
It further affirmed that only the provisions of the ECT determined the question of jurisdiction, while 
EU law was “not relevant to the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.”45 The Tribunal responded 
to the Achmea judgment by expressly agreeing with the Masdar v Spain award, previously 
discussed.46 It added that there are no known intra-EU cases where the ECT objection has worked 
in favour of the Respondent states.47 
In RREEF v Spain, an ICSID case pursuant to the ECT, the Tribunal stressed that Achmea 
and the case before it concerned different legal instruments.48 More importantly, it also added a few 
thoughts on the relationship between EU law and the ECT. The Tribunal reminded that the EU itself 
was a party to the ECT, which binds both the EU and non-EU states. According to the Tribunal, it 
would be “highly improper” for the EU to impose the incompatibility of the ECT with EU law on 
non-EU states.49 One may suggest that the Tribunal sought to neutralize any potential or future 
findings of the Court of Justice that the ECT is incompatible with EU law.  
Lastly, in Greentech v Italy, the Tribunal made a strong reminder that the ECT required 
tribunals to decide disputes in accordance with the ECT itself and the applicable rules and principles 
of international law, but not EU law: 
In the context of the arbitral jurisdiction created by the ECT, reference to “international law” 
cannot be stretched to include EU law, absent doing violence to the text which would be 
impermissible under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (…).50 (emphasis added)  
                                                 
42  Ibid., 150. 
43  Ibid., 161-165. 
44  Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 Sàrl, et al v Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No 2015/150, Final Award, 14 
November 2018, para 212. 
45  Ibid., 218–219. 
46  Ibid., 220. 
47  Ibid., 221. 
48  RREEF Infrastructure (GP) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sà r.l v Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, 30 
November 2018, para 211. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment (SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II 




In conclusion, despite the broad wording of Achmea that would allow for its application to the ECT, 
the arbitral tribunals all came to the same conclusions: Achmea does not preclude intra-EU ECT 
arbitrations. Whilst one could criticize these tribunals for being too formalistic and taking too much 
of a textual approach, their approach is not in itself incorrect, and it is commendable that most of 
them engaged with EU law in quite some length. Furthermore, investment tribunals are known to 
rely heavily in their argumentation on the decisions of other investment tribunals. 51 This is evident 
in the afore-mentioned reliance by the Foresight v Spain Tribunal on the Masdar v Spain reasoning. 
Thus, once a tribunal makes an argument that Achmea does not preclude disputes under the ECT, it 
seems to have a ‘snowball effect’ and subsequent tribunals will rely on these arguments to 
substantiate and legitimize their own arguments.  
 
2.2.1.2  Achmea Is Not Relevant for Ongoing ICSID Cases 
Another set of arguments is used in ICSID arbitrations and concerns the relationship – both factual 
and legal – between Achmea and the ICSID Convention.  
The Tribunal in Marfin v Cyprus - an intra-EU BIT case - reminded the parties that its 
jurisdiction stemmed from both the BIT and the ICSID Convention.52 The principle of the 
irrevocability of consent, as provided in Article 25(1) ICSID Convention, precluded revoking 
consent once perfected. According to the Tribunal, the Claimants managed to perfect the consent 
- while it was still valid - by instituting the proceedings. Thus, the Respondent lost the right to 
revoke it, “especially by implication,” and could only withdraw it in accordance with the provisions 
provided in the BIT.53 
In UP and CD v Hungary, an ICSID case filed under the France-Hungary BIT, the Tribunal 
emphasized the delocalized and autonomous nature of the ICSID legal regime, which governed the 
claim. Conversely, the original Achmea arbitration was subject to the New York Convention regime, 
which allows domestic courts broader control over the arbitral proceedings and the subsequent 
review of the arbitral award. The Tribunal in UP and CD v Hungary reminded the parties that 
Hungary had made no attempt to withdraw its consent under the ICSID Convention. It further 
                                                 
51  OK Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’ (2008) 19 EJIL 2.  
52  Marfin Investment Group v The Republic of Cyprus, ICSID Case No ARB/13/27, Award, 26 July 2018, para 
592. 
53  Ibid., para 593. 
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refused to admit that EU law and Achmea can lead to such withdrawal with retroactive effect.54 
Lastly, the Tribunal noted that neither state-party to the BIT tried to re-negotiate or terminate 
entirely the survival clause. As a result, the clause kept protecting investors even if Achmea led to 
the termination or inapplicability of the BIT, as suggested by the Respondent.55 
One may interpret these arbitral decisions as emphasizing the importance of consent for 
establishing jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention. Consent has a defined timeframe and requires 
perfection from the investor. In both cases, the investors instituted proceedings before the Achmea 
judgment. The principle of the irrevocability of consent under the ICSID Convention insulates the 
once established jurisdiction of the Centre from any attempts of the state to terminate or invalidate 
the international investment agreement (IIA).56 Therefore, it is hard to argue that Achmea has any 
effect on ongoing proceedings under the ICSID Convention, due to both the independence of such 
proceedings from court review and the principle of the irrevocability of consent. At the same time, 
one may equally suggest that Achmea might have a preclusive effect on future ICSID claims – 
launched after the Achmea judgment - to the extent that in intra-EU investment agreements it 
invalidates the open offer of the states to arbitrate.  
Nevertheless, one ICSID decision stands out, as it speaks of the principle of irrevocability as 
being generally applicable to investment proceedings. The Tribunal in RREEF v Spain did not base 
its reasoning on any express reference to the ICSID Convention. Instead, it suggested that once the 
parties have given their consent, “[n]o post-hoc decision of the Court of Justice can somehow undo 
that consent once given.”57 One may try to read an implied reference to the ICSID Convention, as 
the case at hand was an ICSID case. What seems to be equally possible, is that the wording may 
signal the Tribunal’s desire to apply the principle of irrevocability of consent as a general principle 
of investment law.58 If so interpreted, the argument does not accord the Court of Justice’s judgment 
much weight and authority. 
 
                                                 
54  UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and CD Holding Internationale v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/13/35, 
Award, 9 October 2018, para 264. 
55   Ibid., para 265. 
56  Under Article 25(1) ICSID Convention, “When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw 
its consent unilaterally.” See Christoph H Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary : A 
Commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (Cambridge University Press 2009) 259. 
57  RREEF v Spain (Merits) (n 48) para 213. 
58  The fact that the chair is one of the most renowned public international scholars and a frequent counsel in the 
International Court of Justice only reinforces the presumption. 
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2.2.1.3  Other Arguments Used Against Achmea  
In addition to Achmea’s non-application to the ECT and the irrevocability of consent argument, 
investment tribunals have come up with some further arguments for why the Achmea judgment does 
not affect their jurisdiction.  
The Respondent in Marfin v Cyprus pleaded the potential unenforceability of the award due 
to it contradicting EU law. However, the Tribunal decided that issues of enforceability do not relate 
to the question of jurisdiction, which is governed wholly by the BIT and international law. The 
Tribunal refused to determine enforceability as its duty. Instead, it addressed it as a duty of domestic 
courts applying particular leges executionis.59 
In another procedural twist, one tribunal referred en passant to the difference in wording in 
the French and English language versions of the Achmea judgment. In Greentech v Italy, the 
Tribunal noted that while the English version of Achmea addressed Articles 267 and 344 TFEU as 
“precluding provisions”,60 the French version referred to them as “s’opposent,” which the Tribunal 
interpreted as carrying “a notion of tension or incompatibility (as between the TFEU and BIT 
arbitration) rather than supervening illegality.”61 After concluding that Achmea is not preclusive to 
jurisdiction as a matter of principle,62 the Tribunal briefly agreed on the compatibility of the ECT 
with intra-EU ISDS. 
 
 
2.2.2 Tribunals that Refuse to Admit Achmea as a Jurisdictional Objection 
In some cases, investment tribunals relied on procedural reasons to not address Achmea, despite the 
effects it could potentially have on their jurisdiction and the outcome of the proceedings. Two such 
arguments are handled in this section: (a) the Respondent waives the jurisdictional objections based 
on EU law, which the Tribunal interprets as including Achmea, and (b) the Achmea objection was 
submitted too late.  
Antaris v Czech Republic is a peculiar case, as it was not the Tribunal that refused to consider 
the Achmea objection, but the Respondent in its counter-memorial expressly waived any 
                                                 
59  Marfin v Cyprus (Award) (n 52) para 596. 
60  Greentech v Italy (Final award) (n 50) para 393 referring to CJEU Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:15862, para 62. 
61  Greentech v Italy (Final award) (n 50) para 394. 
62  Ibid., para 395. 
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jurisdictional objections based on EU law. The waiver did not mention Achmea, but referred to ‘the 
jurisdictional objection articulated by the Commission before [the] Tribunal.’63 Based on the 
Commission’s line of reasoning in other cases, one may suggest that the objection covered all issues 
of incompatibility with EU law, including the particular grounds mentioned later in Achmea. 
The timeline of the proceedings can also be of crucial importance when deciding on the 
admission of new arguments or evidence. It is fair to expect that the proceedings should follow an 
established timeline as any additional interventions might compromise the integrity of the 
proceedings. In the ECT case of Antin v Spain, the proceedings ended a couple of weeks before the 
Court of Justice delivered Achmea.64 The next day, after the judgment became public, the 
Respondent applied for the re-opening of the proceedings.65 However, the Tribunal decided to reject 
the request.66 Notably, two years earlier, the Commission requested the Tribunal to allow it to 
participate in the proceedings. The Tribunal conditioned the Commission’s participation on the 
acceptance of an undertaking on costs.67 Being unable to commit to such an undertaking, the 
Commission revoked its application for participation.68 
Conversely, in Gavrilovic v Croatia, the Tribunal refused to take Achmea into account due to 
the Respondent’s late filing of the objections, even though the proceedings were still open.69 In 
2012, the investor filed its claims under the Austria-Croatia BIT in accordance with the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules. Four years later, the parties had two series of hearings and after another two 
years, the Tribunal was close to rendering an award. In March 2018, the Tribunal had notified the 
parties that the award would come out in a few months. However, when the Respondent decided to 
submit a ‘preliminary jurisdictional objection’ based on Achmea, under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41, 
the Tribunal dismissed it, arguing that it was filed in a non-timely fashion.70 The justification 
requires a short review. 
                                                 
63  Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr Michael Göde v Czech Republic, PCA Case No 2014-01, Award, 2 May 2018; 
para 73; see also Greentech v Italy (Final award) (n 50) para 400. 
64  Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sà.r.l and Antin Energia Termosolar BV v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No ARB/13/31, Award, 15 June 2018, para 55. 
65  Ibid., para 56. 
66  Ibid., para 58. 
67  Ibid., para 64. 
68  Ibid., para 66. 
69  Georg Gavrilovic and Gavrilovic d.o.o v Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No ARB/12/39, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Request of 4 April 2018, 30 April 2018. 
70  Ibid., para 39. 
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As a first ground, the Tribunal stated that the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal is not a 
matter of competence of the EU judicial system. Secondly, all issues raised in Achmea (except for 
the decision itself) belonged to public knowledge, available to the parties for years.71 The principal 
decision itself “is legal rather than factual in nature: it clarifies the law in the EU”.72 Accordingly, 
the Tribunal refused to recognize it as a new fact worth addressing in the preliminary objections. 
Thirdly, the Respondent has never raised the incompatibility argument earlier and did not ask for 
the suspension of proceedings pending the Achmea decision.73 Fourthly, the Tribunal referred to a 
specific article of the BIT, releasing the parties from any obligations inconsistent with the EU legal 
order.74 Despite its authentic character and potential effect, the Respondent had not made use of that 
article in the course of the proceedings.75 Fifthly, the Tribunal referred to the late stage of the 
proceedings and the expectation of the award within just a few months.76 The two last reasons 
addressed a discretionary power of the Tribunal under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(2) to consider 
late jurisdictional objections, which the Tribunal decided to decline.77 
In less than three months, the Tribunal rendered a 376-page award, which together with the 
annexes totalled 757 pages.78 In the Award, the Tribunal recognized a claim for expropriation. 
However, the Tribunal declined to award any significant sums of the damages claimed, recognizing 
less than 2% of the quantum.79 
The case indicates a thin line between the questions of applicable law and the flexibility of 
the procedural setting, including the principle of the integrity of the proceedings and their adversary 
character. The failure to exercise the rights at the earliest convenience or at least to make necessary 
reservations may lead to adverse consequences for a party, no matter of the strength of its legal 
position. 
       
                                                 
71  Ibid., para 41. 
72  Ibid., para 42. 
73  Ibid., para 43. 
74  Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Croatia for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments 1997, Art 11(2): “The Contracting Parties are not bound by the present Agreement insofar as it is 
incompatible with the legal acquis of the European Union (EU) in force at any given time.” 
75  Gavrilovic v Croatia (Decision on Achmea) (n 69) para 44. 
76   Ibid., para 45. 
77   Ibid., para 46–47. 
78  Georg Gavrilovic and Gavrilovic d.o.o v Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No ARB/12/39, Award, 26 July 
2018. 
79   Ibid., para 1318. 
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2.2.3 Interim Conclusions  
To conclude, there is a representative sample of cases where tribunals have assessed the relevance 
and legal effects of Achmea. Whilst Achmea is used by the Respondent or the Commission to target 
the tribunals’ jurisdiction, tribunals may accept it as a jurisdictional objection or reject it under 
various procedural grounds. One may also trace the formation of a jurisprudence constante 
concerning the relationship between the ECT and Achmea, the tribunals ignoring the applicability 
of the latter. Another example is the alleged non-applicability of Achmea in ICSID cases due to the 
principle of the irrevocability of consent under the ICSID Convention. Rather unexpectedly, even 
in non-ICSID cases filed under intra-EU BITs, tribunals found at least one ground to dismiss 
Achmea, due to late submission. As a result, in none of the observed cases did objections based on 
the Achmea judgment lead to the termination of intra-EU investment treaty arbitration cases. 
 
3 Rendering an Award When it is Unenforceable in/by one of the Disputing Parties  
 
In order to provide some analytical clarity, we need to differentiate between several concepts and 
perspectives. One is the difference between the existence of an international adjudicatory 
mechanism and the enforceability of its awards. The other is the different perspectives one can take, 
depending on whether it is an EU or an international law perspective. 
From the perspective of EU law, after the Achmea judgment, the very existence of arbitral 
tribunals under intra-EU BITs is precluded by EU law. In other words, from the perspective of EU 
law, awards rendered by intra-EU arbitral tribunals are unenforceable in the EU because the very 
existence of the tribunals that rendered them is precluded by EU law. Conversely, from the 
perspective of international law, until the contracting parties to the intra-EU BITs do not amend or 
terminate them (and the ECT), investors will be able to bring arbitral claims and tribunals will be 
validly constituted under international law. Furthermore, if the contracting parties do not terminate 
the sunset clauses, arbitral tribunals can be validly constituted under these agreements, even if 
investors bring claims following their termination. In other words, until the EU Member States do 
not act on the international level, these arbitral tribunals are validly constituted and deliver awards 
which can be enforced under the New York Convention or the ICSID Convention.  
Given this conundrum, the likelihood that the number of intra-EU arbitral cases will rise in 
the upcoming years is high, as signalled by the high number of pending cases in Annex 1. 
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Furthermore, as the previously analysed cases clearly show, arbitral tribunals always find a way to 
uphold their jurisdiction when the Respondent or the Commission challenge their jurisdiction 
pursuant to EU law arguments. 
This being said, the first part of this section discusses how the rendering of potentially 
unenforceable decisions by international tribunals is not specific to intra-EU investment disputes. 
We then discuss why intra-EU investment tribunals might uphold their jurisdiction and render an 
award when they know that the Respondent will not/cannot enforce it. 
 
3.1  It is Not Specific to Intra-EU Investment Disputes 
The rendering of a decision by an international tribunal, when it knows in the jurisdictional or the 
merits phase that one of the disputing parties will not enforce it or comply with it, is not restricted 
to investment law.  
The South China Sea arbitration80 is a telling example. In this case, the Philippines unilaterally 
initiated compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 287 and Annex VII of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning the role of China’s ‘historic rights’ and maritime 
entitlements in the South China Sea. China unequivocally rejected the arbitration and protested by 
not participating.81 Despite China’s protests, the UNCLOS Tribunal ended up delivering a first 
award on jurisdiction and admissibility,82 followed by a final award on the merits.83 The Tribunal 
had done so knowing that China will most probably not comply with the award. Following the 
rendering of the final award, China maintained its position that the arbitration was a “political farce 
and the award was illegal, null, and void”.84 
The Arctic Sunrise dispute, concerning the seizing of a Greenpeace ship by the Russian 
authorities, is another example of an international tribunal having to render a decision knowing that 
the Respondent state will most likely not comply with it. In the case brought by the Netherlands 
against Russia before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (provisional measures) and 
                                                 
80  PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China), Case 
No 2013-19 <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/> accessed 1 June 2019.  
81  For a fairly one-sided, Chinese perspective on the arbitration see Chinese Society of International Law, ‘The 
South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study’ [2018] 17 Chinese Journal of International Law 207. 
See also, Y Mincai, ‘China’s Responses to the Compulsory Arbitration on the South China Sea Dispute: Legal 
Effects and Policy Options’ [2014] 45 Ocean Development & International Law 1.  
82  The South China Sea Arbitration (n 80) Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 29 October 2015. 
83  The South China Sea Arbitration (n 80) Award, 12 July 2016. 
84  H Duy Phan, L Ngoc Nguyen, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration: Bindingness, Finality, and Compliance with 
UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Decisions’ [2017] 38 Asian Journal of International Law 36, 37.  
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an Annex VII UNCLOS Tribunal, Russia informed both the Netherlands and ITLOS that “it does 
not accept” the Annex VII Arbitration and it did “not intend to participate” in the ITLOS 
proceedings for the prescription of provisional measures.85 Russia based its non-participation on a 
statement made upon the ratification of UNCLOS, according to which it does not accept procedures 
entailing binding decisions with respect to disputes “concerning law-enforcement activities in 
regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction”.86 Despite these objections, ITLOS ordered 
that the ship and the detained persons should be immediately released.87 The Annex VII Tribunal 
ruled that it had jurisdiction and that Russia’s declaration upon the ratification of UNCLOS did not 
exclude the dispute.88 Furthermore, Russia had to compensate the Netherlands, as the flagship 
country, for breaching UNCLOS.89 
Another set of notable cases are the investor-state arbitrations against Russia arising after the 
Crimean Annexation. As of 2015, investors have been filing claims against Russia under the 
Russia-Ukraine BIT for the alleged interference and expropriation of their investments in Crimea. 
The Russian response to all the claims has been consistent over the years. According to the first 
available press-releases, Russia informed the PCA that it does not recognize the tribunals’ 
jurisdiction under the BIT and chooses not to appoint any representatives.90 Russia has not shown 
up in the course of the proceedings, did not attend the hearings or otherwise participate. 
Nevertheless, tribunals tend to accept jurisdiction over the investors’ claims. Some of them have 
resulted in awards on the merits against Russia.91 In all these cases, the tribunals faced a denial of 
                                                 
85  Note Verbale of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Berlin, 22 October 2013, 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Note_verbale_Russian_Federation_eng.p
df>  accessed 1 June 2019. 
86  Ibid., p 2.  
87  ITLOS, The ‘Arctic Sunrise Case’ (Kingdom of the Netherlands v Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, 
Order of 22 November 2013, p 252.  
88  PCA, The Artic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v Russia), Case No 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction, para 79. 
89  PCA, The Artic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v Russia), Case No 2014-02, Award on Compensation, para 
128. 
90  Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-07, 
Press Release, 6 January 2016; JSC CB PrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v The Russian 
Federation, PCA Case No 2015-21, Press release, 30 March 2016; LLC Lugzor et al v The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No 2015-29, Press Release, 13 December 2017; PJSC Ukrnafta v The Russian Federation, PCA 
Case No 2015-34, Press Release, 2 May 2016; Stabil LLC et al v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-
35, Press Release, 2 May 2016; Everest Estate LLC et al v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-36, 
Press Release, 9 August 2016; NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine (Ukraine) et al v The Russian Federation, PCA Case 
No 2017-16. 
91  Everest Estate LLC et al v The Russian Federation, PCA Case 2015-36, Press Release, 9 May 2018; Aeroport 
Belbek LLC and Mr Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-07, Press 
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jurisdiction by the Respondent and had to decide on the matter without any expectation of voluntary 
compliance. 
In the case of the intra-EU investment arbitrations, the non-enforcement of the awards is also 
not hypothetical, but a reality and an obligation under EU law. So far, we have seen two types of 
incompatibility with EU law that led to the non-enforcement of the arbitral award. Firstly, in the 
case of the Micula I award92 - rendered prior to the Achmea judgment - the arbitral tribunal itself 
was not deemed to be incompatible with EU law (at that point in time). What was deemed to be 
incompatible – by the Commission – was the compliance with the award by Romania, i.e. the 
payment of damages by Romania to an EU investor, which contravened EU state aid rules.93 The 
Romanian Constitutional Court also gave precedence to the primacy of EU law over Romania’s 
international obligations under ICSID.94 The second type of incompatibility – following the Achmea 
judgment - concerns the incompatibility of the tribunal itself with EU law. In such a case, the mere 
existence of the arbitral tribunal is precluded by EU law. Following the Court of Justice’s judgment 
in Achmea, the Federal Court of Germany – the court that made the preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice - ended up setting aside the original Achmea award.95  
In the next section the paper looks at why international tribunals render awards which are very 
likely not to be enforced/complied with by the Respondent state. 
 
3.2  Why Do International Tribunals Uphold their Jurisdiction when they Render Potentially 
Unenforceable Awards? 
Whilst different in many ways – the subject area, the applicable legal rules, the procedure, the 
tribunals – the common element in the South China Sea case, the Arctic Sunrise case, the investment 
arbitrations arising out of the Crimean dispute, and the post-Achmea intra-EU arbitrations is that 
                                                 
Release, 15 February 2019; JSC CB PrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No 2015-21, Press Release, 15 February 2019. 
92  Ioan Micula et.al. v Romania, ICSID Case no ARB/05/20, Final Award, 11 December 2013. 
93  EC Decision 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by 
Romania – arbitral award Micula v. Romania of 11 December 2013, OJ L 232, 43. 
94  Constitutional Court of Romania (Curtea Constituțională a României), Decision No 887 of 15 December 2015 
(‘Micula and European Food’).  
95  Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof), Case I ZB 2/15, Decision of 24 January 2019. See S Schwalb 
and S Arzner, ‘The German Federal Court of Justice rules in Achmea - entry into the EU renders Slovakia's 
offer for Intra-EU arbitration inapplicable’ [2019] 




the tribunals in the jurisdictional phase already knew that the Respondent (most likely) will not 
enforce the awards or comply with them. The tactics used by the Respondents differed. China did 
not participate in the arbitration and initiated a campaign to undermine the credibility of the 
UNCLOS Tribunal, Russia sent a note verbale to ITLOS and the Netherlands concerning its 
non-participation, whilst the EU Member States participated in the arbitrations brought against them 
and raised legal arguments against the tribunals’ jurisdiction. The outcomes were the same: the 
tribunals upheld their jurisdiction and decided on the merits.  
The question is why tribunals choose to uphold their jurisdiction when it is almost certain that 
the respondents will not comply with their decisions or enforce the awards. This question is even 
more important if one accepts the traditional view that compliance is central to the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of international law and adjudication.96 However, as Davenport argues - in the 
context of the South China Sea Arbitration and using the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment against the 
USA as an example - the decision of an international tribunal has value, even if it is not complied 
with, such as enhancing the legitimacy of the system, interpreting the law, shaping future 
negotiations between the disputing parties, and impacting other state and non-state actors.97 
Therefore, in the following, we argue that several reasons exist - depending on whether one takes a 
more conservative, dogmatic view or a law in context approach - as to why intra-EU investment 
tribunals still go forward with their decisions.  
Firstly, one can take a more dogmatic view and argue that the intra-EU tribunals did nothing 
more than read and interpret the legal rules granting them jurisdiction, which allowed them to 
conclude that they had jurisdiction. Thus, such tribunals derive their jurisdiction from international 
agreements which are still valid under international law, and the EU treaties have not replaced or 
superseded the intra-EU BITs when newer states joined the EU. However, when every, 
independently constituted intra-EU tribunal comes to the same conclusion – affirming their 
jurisdiction – even when the cases are different and the legal arguments being raised differ, then 
one wonders if the outcome is really based only on what the law allows them to conclude. As 
                                                 
96  Y Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (OUP 2014) 117. Shany takes the view that 
judgment-compliance “is not a reliable indicator of judicial effectiveness” p 118. For a discussion of why 
states comply with international law, see A Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice 
Theory’ (OUP 2008) who coins the expression the “Three Rs of Compliance”: reciprocity, retaliation ad 
reputation.  
97  T Davenport, ‘Why the South China Sea Arbitration Case Matters (Even if China Ignores It)’ [2016] The 
Diplomat, 8 July 2016 <https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-case-matters-
even-if-china-ignores-it/> accessed 1 June 2019. 
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Koutrakos noted in the intra-EU BIT context prior to Achmea, intra-EU investment tribunals take 
an unduly formalistic view on the matter of jurisdiction and only focus on the narrow issue of 
compliance with international law, disregarding the complexities faced by ‘national courts […] 
called upon to enforce the award whilst they […] struggle to identify their obligations under parallel 
and interacting sets of rules’.98 Whilst this might be the case for intra-EU BITs, it is hard to argue 
that the South China Sea or Arctic Sunrise Tribunals took an unduly formalistic attitude towards 
their jurisdiction under UNCLOS, when the respondents did not even participate in the disputes to 
raise legal arguments against the jurisdiction of those tribunals..  
Secondly, one could argue that the tribunals might interpret their jurisdiction more broadly or 
narrowly depending on the effectiveness of the enforcement/compliance mechanism of the legal 
regime they operate in. Thus, international tribunals will interpret their jurisdiction narrowly if they 
know that compliance with their decision or its enforcement is only dependent on the Respondent 
state. Conversely, tribunals will interpret their jurisdiction broadly if compliance or enforcement is 
not solely dependent on the Respondent state. For example, investment law has quite an effective 
enforcement mechanism, via the New York and ICSID Conventions. Thus, in an ICSID arbitration, 
the investor can seek to enforce its award in any member of the ICSID Convention. In other words, 
if the respondent State fails to enforce the award, the investors can seek enforcement in another 
ICSID member, just like the Micula brothers sought enforcement in US courts.99  
It follows that intra-EU tribunals might be willing to interpret their jurisdiction expansively 
and disregard Achmea, because they know that their awards are enforceable in non-EU countries, 
even if the EU Member States argue that they cannot enforce the awards due to EU legal 
impediments. Nonetheless, we see the opposite in the South China Sea dispute. Even if the Tribunal 
knew that compliance with the award by an objecting member of the UN Security Council will 
likely be impossible and there was no other effective means of enforcement, it still upheld its 
jurisdiction and decided the case.100 Furthermore, as previously discussed, the investment tribunal 
in Marfin v Cyprus decided that issues of enforceability do not relate to the question of jurisdiction, 
governed wholly by the BIT and international law, and it refused to determine enforceability as its 
                                                 
98  P Koutrakos, ‘The Relevance of EU Law for Arbitral Tribunals: (Not) Managing the Lingering Tensions’ 
[2016] 17 JWIT 873, 880.  
99  For example US District Court for the District of Columbia, Viorel Micula v The Government of Romania, 
Civil No 1:14-cv-00600, Decision on the Claimant’s Motion to confirm the ICSID Award.  
100  As Phan and Nguyen point out, compliance with UNCLOS arbitrations is quite high, with only the Arctic 
Sunrise and South China Sea disputes as exceptions. See Phan and Nguyen (n 84) 47. 
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duty.101 Thus, at least for some international tribunals, the effectiveness of the compliance or 
enforcement mechanism does not seem to influence how broadly they interpret their jurisdiction.  
Thirdly, as Shany notes, it might also be that international courts “hungry for cases or eager 
to advance a certain normative agenda may read their jurisdictional powers in an expansive 
manner”.102 To what extent this might be the case for intra-EU BITs is hard to tell. On the one hand, 
one can argue that investment tribunals cannot be hungry for more cases, since – unlike standing 
international courts – they are only set up to adjudicate a specific case, after which they are 
dissolved. On the other hand, it could be argued that arbitrators – some of whom are repeatedly 
appointed103 – want to send a signal to investors that despite the Achmea decision, investor-state 
arbitration is a viable dispute resolution mechanism and the system is apt to hear potential cases. 
This idea does not seem that farfetched. As Fauchald’s empirical analysis from 2008 shows, ICSID 
tribunals have a tendency of developing a homogenous methodology – despite their ad hoc nature 
and the heterogeneous legal sources based on which they have to solve legal disputes – using case 
law from other investment tribunals as their main interpretative argument.104 We see the same 
tendency in the intra-EU BIT cases as well (both pre and post-Achmea) in which tribunals often rely 
on arguments used by previous tribunals to dismiss the objections to their jurisdiction based on EU 
law and the Achmea judgment.105  
Fourthly, some goals of international tribunals seem to be common to all judicial institutions, 
goals such as a normative agenda, “dispute resolution, problem solving, regime support, and 
legitimation.”106 One can thus argue that the intra-EU tribunals are willing to uphold their 
jurisdiction even after Achmea because their primary role is to solve the dispute between an investor 
and the host State, as well as to interpret and clarify the law.107 Whether or not compliance and 
enforcement can be achieved, does not affect the main task of investment tribunals: the settlement 
of investor-State disputes (see the Marfin v Cyprus Tribunal) and the interpretation of the law. 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice’s Achmea ruling in essence questions the very existence of such 
tribunals; a regional court, deriving its jurisdiction from another set of international treaties, is 
                                                 
101  Marfin v Cyprus (Award) (n 52) para 596. 
102  Shany (n 96) 79.   
103  See M Langford, D Behn and R Lie, ‘The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration’ [2017] 
20(2) Journal of International Economic Law 301. 
104  See Fauchald (n 51).  
105  See n 46; the Foresight v Spain Tribunal referred to the arguments of the Masdar v Spain Tribunal. 
106  Shany (n 96) 123.  
107  See also Davenport (n 97). 
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telling another international tribunal (even if just ad hoc) that their very existence under a different 
set of international treaties is precluded by the former set of treaties. Thus, one should not be 
surprised that in an effort to legitimize the investment law system based on which they operate, 
intra-EU tribunals will push back against Achmea. This push-back is most evident in RREEF v 
Spain in which the Tribunal went as far as to criticize the part of the Achmea judgment in which the 
Court of Justice differentiates between commercial and investment treaty arbitration.108 Henceforth, 
even if on the surface most investment tribunals take account of the Court of Justice’s judgment and 
engage with EU law, their ultimate decision is not affected by it.  
Fifthly, ad hoc tribunals do not have security of tenure as standing tribunals do and the 
remuneration of their members will depend on each individual case. More so, depending on the 
institutional rules under which the arbitration is conducted, arbitrators might receive their 
remuneration after different stages of the proceedings. In other words, the longer the proceedings 
the more remuneration they will get. Thus, one could argue that it makes more sense to uphold 
jurisdiction and continue a case if this affects the remuneration of the arbitrators.  
In conclusion, intra-EU investment tribunals can have various reasons to uphold their 
jurisdiction and decide on the merits, even if they know that following the Achmea judgment, the 
Respondent states will not be able to enforce their awards. The most compelling reason seems to be 
the one evoked by the Marfin v Cyprus Tribunal. Enforceability is a separate issue from jurisdiction. 
Thus, in the jurisdictional phase a tribunal should decide based on the law in front of it, and not 
whether the decision will be enforced or complied with.  
 
4 The Way Forward?  
 
From the perspective of the effective administration of justice the present situation is clearly 
untenable. Two different judicial fora have opposite views on the same matter: according to the 
Court of Justice the very existence of intra-EU investment tribunals is precluded by EU law, while 
the arbitral tribunals disagree with the Court of Justice and uphold their jurisdiction on international 
law grounds. As Witte notes: 
                                                 
108  RREEF v Spain (n 48) Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, para 213.   
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… neither system with its respective adjudicative body can forcefully subordinate the other 
to its will. Although either system with its respective adjudicative body maintains its claim to 
supremacy, the reality of their relationship is one of heterarchy.109 
 
The effects of the tension between EU and investment law, however, do not stop at the disagreement 
of two adjudicative bodies or at the level of academic debates. For investors, host States, and 
national courts – both EU and non-EU - the status quo creates uncertainties. Investors that won the 
arbitration and are awarded compensation, cannot enforce it in 28 EU Member States, so they have 
to spend extra time and resources to enforce the awards in non-EU countries, without the guarantee 
of success.110 National courts are also put in a delicate position. EU national courts must choose 
between two competing legal obligations: those under EU law and those under their investment 
agreements, as well as the ICSID and New York Conventions. Under EU law, they will have to 
grant primacy to their EU law obligations. Non-EU courts, such as those of the United States, are 
then asked to tackle the enforcement of such awards. This in turn exposes them to the murky and 
muddied waters of the relationship of these agreements with the internal legal order of another 
international actor. EU Member States are also in a position of not knowing whether or not to 
continue challenging the jurisdiction of intra-EU investment tribunals or simply move forward with 
the arbitration.111 Later on, if they choose to enforce the arbitral awards, they will contravene EU 
law and risk an infringement case, as the example of Romania shows in the Micula I case.  
In the following we argue that in the interest of the effective administration of justice112 
investment tribunals could give more weight to the Achmea judgment and decline their jurisdiction 
as a sign of judicial comity. Otherwise, they could still uphold their jurisdiction, but decline the case 
as inadmissible for the interest of upholding the effective administration of justice. We of course 
                                                 
109  I Witte, ‘Interaction between International Investment Law and Constitutional Law: Promoting the Dialogue. 
A European Perspective on Judicial Cooperation and Deference’ [2018] 21(1) Max Planck Yearbook of United 
National Law Online 469, 516. On legal heterarchy see D Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The 
Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States’, in JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman (eds), 
Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009).  
110  See, for example, USDC for the District of Columbia, Novenegia II v Kingdom of Spain Civil Action No. 1:18-
cv-1148 in which the investor is seeking to confirm an arbitral award against Spain. See US District Court for 
the District of Columbia, Viorel Micula v The Government of Romania (n 99) in which the US court denied 
the investors’ petition to confirm the ICSID Award.  
111  See (n 63) the waiver of the jurisdiction objections by the Czech Republic.  
112  For this idea see Caroline Henckels, ‘Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO – FTA Nexus: A 
Potential Approach to the WTO’ [2008] 19(3) EJIL 571.  
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realise that in light of what we have seen so far, most of these proposals will remain at the theoretical 
level.  
 
4.1  Judicial Comity. Doubtful it will Work 
The interaction between EU law and investment law is not new to academic debates. Recently, 
Witte argued in favour of judicial dialogue following a ‘heterarchical conceptualization’ of the 
relationship between the two fields of law, which: 
…should further prompt investment tribunals to abstain from isolationist constructions of 
international investment law because only decisions that engage in the difficult exercise of 
balancing conflicting interests can find constitutional acceptance.113 
 
This proposal – made prior to the delivery of the Achmea judgment – cannot, however, adequately 
address the post-Achmea reality. The very existence of these tribunals is precluded by or is 
incompatible with - depending on which translation of the judgment one follows - EU law. Thus, 
no amount of balancing of conflicting interests by intra-EU tribunals will gain constitutional 
acceptance by the Court of Justice. Furthermore, some judicial dialogue has already occurred at the 
level of judicial engagement. We have seen that some intra-EU tribunals, especially the one in 
Vattenfall, have extensively considered EU law and Achmea, without declining their jurisdiction. 
Therefore, we believe that - given the current situation - dialogue might not be sufficient to solve 
the conundrum and instead we look at whether judicial comity could provide some guidance (albeit 
with the reservation that in practice tribunals probably will not consider it).  
According to the Oxford Reference definition, ‘judicial comity’ refers to the “principle that, 
out of deference and respect, the courts in one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and 
judicial decisions of another”.114 As Henckels notes, “it allows a court to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over matters that would be more appropriately heard by another tribunal,” but it does 
not impose a legal obligation on tribunals.115 
                                                 
113  Witte (n 109) 519.  
114  Oxford Reference <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100026381> 
accessed 1 June 2019; See JR Paul, ‘Comity in International Law ’ [1991] 32(1) Harvard Int’l LJ 2. One could 
also draw parallels with the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, a conflict of laws doctrine that 
applies between courts in different jurisdictions in the same country or between courts of different countries.    
115  Henckels (n 112) 584. Swarabowicz pleads for the consolidation of investment cases according to private law 
rules, see M Swarabowicz, ‘Identity of Claims in Investment Arbitration: A Plea for Unity of the Legal System’ 
[2017] 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 280. 
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This concept is not alien to international law. The MOX Plant dispute between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom, concerning the deposit of nuclear waste close to the Irish Sea, ended up before 
three international/regional tribunals: the Court of Justice of the EU,116 an UNCLOS Annex VII 
Tribunal,117 and a Tribunal constituted under the OSPAR Convention.118 The UNCLOS Annex VII 
arbitration is the posterchild of judicial comity between two different international courts. The 
Tribunal suspended the proceedings based on the principle of mutual respect and comity until a 
pending issue that affected the tribunal’s jurisdiction was handled by the Court of Justice.  
One could argue that in the interest of the effective administration of justice, intra-EU 
tribunals (both those based on the ECT and BITs) could, pursuant to the principle of mutual respect 
and comity, decline their jurisdiction. Henckels argues that tribunals possess the inherent power to 
find that they do not have jurisdiction in a case and to decline to exercise it.119 This, however, has 
yet to happen in intra-EU cases (and we are doubtful that it will), even in cases in which the MOX 
Plant arbitration was relied on by the Respondent.  
In the UP and CD v Hungary arbitration - commenced under the France-Hungary BIT - the 
tribunal had to consider whether the MOX Plant arbitration120 under UNCLOS could give it 
guidance. The Tribunal succinctly concluded that MOX Plant “provides no useful guidance in view 
of the considerable differences between that case and the present one”.121 According to the Tribunal, 
the two cases differ because in MOX Plant the EU was a party to UNCLOS, there was a risk of 
future conflicting decisions, and the MOX Plant Tribunal in the end did not decide on its jurisdiction 
because Ireland withdrew its claim.122  
The decision of the Tribunal is not without criticism. The Tribunal takes an overly formalistic 
reading of MOX Plant and why it was relevant to the case. It was relevant because it was an example 
of how one tribunal can act – suspending the proceedings- when its jurisdiction might be/is affected 
by another international tribunal. Thus, the essence of both cases was similar. Furthermore, since 
                                                 
116  CJEU C-459/03, Commission v Ireland [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:345.  
117  PCA, UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), PCA Case 2002-01, 
Order of 24 June 2003. See N Lavranos, ‘The Epilogue in the MOX Plant Dispute: An End Without Findings’ 
[2009] 18(1) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 180. 
118  PCA, OSPAR Arbitral Tribunal (MOX Plant), (Ireland v United Kingdom), PCA Case NO 2001-03, Final 
Award, 2 July 2003. 
119  Henckels (112) 583. 
120  PCA, UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, The MOX Plant Case (n 117).  
121  UP and DC v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/13/35, Award, 9 October 2018, para 276.  
122  Ibid., paras 277-279. 
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the EU is a party to the ECT, it would follow from the Tribunal’s logic that the MOX Plant case 
would be applicable to ECT cases.  
In the original Achmea v Slovakia arbitration, the Respondent and the Commission also raised 
the argument of judicial comity pursuant to the Mox Plant arbitration123 and advised the Tribunal 
to follow the MOX Plant Tribunal and suspend the proceedings. The Tribunal ended up not 
addressing this argument.  
Prior to Achmea, Koutrakos argued that investment tribunals would either engage or not 
engage with EU law at all. He gave the example of the tribunal in EURAM v Slovakia124 as an 
illustration of the tribunal’s engagement with and understanding of EU law, even if in the end the 
tribunal upheld its jurisdiction. Whilst this example is commendable, the empirical part of this paper 
clearly shows that so far in none of the pre and post-Achmea cases did the tribunals relinquish their 
jurisdiction pursuant to objections based on EU law. Thus, whether or not a tribunal engages with 
EU law makes little practical difference if they still uphold their jurisdiction. In other words, 
engagement with EU law that is not followed by a relinquishment of jurisdiction is not enough to 
provide more legal certainty and coherence.  
There are some further issues to consider as well with the proposal that intra-EU tribunals 
should decline their jurisdiction based on judicial comity. Firstly, what is the benefit of this approach 
and to whom? One can of course argue, as we have previously done, that this would benefit the 
effective administration of justice and it would provide legal certainty. The counter argument to 
this, is that it will not benefit investors who expect that a certain level of protection is offered to 
them by IIAs. They have a right to initiate a claim, granted to them by sovereign states pursuant to 
an international treaty, and the Tribunal would deprive them from that right by declining its 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, it can also be argued that by going forward with the case, intra-EU 
tribunals help create more uncertainty for the investors. Probably not many investors want to spend 
millions of dollars on expensive, multi-year arbitrations (the average of which takes 4 years),125 just 
                                                 
123  PCA Eureko (Achmea) v Slovakia, Case No 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 
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to find out that the award is unenforceable. Whilst outside-EU enforcement is possible under ICSID, 
there is no conclusive empirical evidence of how many of the enforcement cases launched by the 
investors before third-country courts have proven to be successful. 
Secondly, the UP and CD v Hungary Tribunal raised the question of which neutral forum 
would be competent to hear the dispute in the eventually that it declined jurisdiction because the 
Respondent failed to show that the Claimants would have standing before the domestic courts. 
Furthermore, the “vague principle” of mutual trust that applies between EU Member States and 
their courts, is inapplicable to investment tribunals.126  
The question of which neutral forum would hear the dispute in case the investment tribunals 
were to decline their jurisdiction has both a legal and a factual component to it. If the treaty has a 
fork-in-the-road clause127 or a non-U turn clause,128 then the investor could technically not rely 
anymore on domestic courts.129 In reality, however, fork-in-the-road clauses are easy to circumvent.  
In order for this clause to properly operate one would need an identity of the facts, the disputing 
parties and the legal rules invoked. In most cases, however, the domestic dispute is brought by a 
different legal entity than the international one, the facts of the domestic case differ, as well as the 
legal rules invoked in the case.130 Thus, if intra-EU investment tribunals were to decline their 
jurisdiction, the investors could still bring a case before domestic courts, the latter being a fairly 
widespread option even when investor have the opportunity to resort to investment treaty 
arbitration.131  
In conclusion, whilst judicial comity that results in a declination of jurisdiction in favour of 
EU courts (both national and EU level) might seem to be a more far-reaching solution, than judicial 
dialogue in the form of judicial engagement, we believe that in practice – as already shown by two 
cases – intra-EU tribunals will not follow this approach.  
                                                 
ICSID Process: New Statistical Insights and Comparative Lessons from Other Institutions’ [2004] 11(1) 
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4.2  Uphold the Jurisdiction but Declare the Case Inadmissible? 
The second proposal we discuss is a bit more controversial as it relies on differentiating between 
jurisdiction and admissibility. Whilst the difference between the two is a debated topic and 
academics differ132 as to where the separation between the two lies, we take the views expounded 
by Shany and Reinisch to differentiate between the two concepts. According to Shany, the 
jurisdiction of a court – dictating who can access the court, when, which issues can be litigated, etc. 
– is set out in the constitutive documents of the court. Traditionally, one speaks of four facets of 
jurisdiction: ratione materiae, ratione temporae, ratione personae, and ratione loci.133 
Admissibility, on the other hand, denotes a court’s discretionary power to admit a specific case or 
not; the power to decline hearing the case even when it has affirmed jurisdiction.134 Thus, in the 
words of Reinisch “[i]n this sense, jurisdiction is a primary issue which has to be affirmed first; and 
admissibility may be a secondary issue that only arises once a tribunal has affirmed its 
jurisdiction.”135  
Based on the above, one could argue that an intra-EU tribunal could fist uphold its jurisdiction, 
despite the objections based on Achmea, but then decide that the case is inadmissible. However, 
based on what ground(s) could an intra-EU tribunal do so? According to Shany, “rules on 
admissibility allow courts to engage in some degree of case selection according to their internal 
policy preferences and in response to external expectations [emphasis added].”136 Therefore, the 
grounds for declining admissibility would be at the discretion of the tribunals. 
Some international courts dismiss a case on the basis of ‘external’ legal rules, which are not 
found in the constitutive instruments of the court. This may suggest “that an international court [can 
regard] the need to protect the systemic welfare of international law as a worthy goal that must be 
pursued”.137 International courts have also upheld “their right to decline jurisdiction in 
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circumstances where the exercise of [it] would have run contrary to a legal principle”.138 Could one 
argue that ‘effective administration of justice’ is such a principle or an ‘external’ legal rule?  
In light of what we have seen, an argument could be made that the current tangled web of 
national, supranational and international procedures does not ensure the effective administration of 
justice. Thus, intra-EU tribunals – instead of declining their jurisdiction based on EU law and 
Achmea - could continue upholding their jurisdiction based on the IIAs. This would ensure that the 
way in which jurisdiction is upheld in investment law is consistent within the system. Nevertheless, 
once jurisdiction is upheld, they could decline to admit the case pursuant to the need to ensure the 
effective administration of justice. We are of course aware that this is a longshot as “international 
courts sometimes tend to retain cases when they face a strong institutional interest in doing so, even 
in the face of jurisdictional competition.”139 
In conclusion, upholding their jurisdiction and then dismissing the case based on the effective 
administration of justice could help the intra-EU tribunals to continue past practice relating to the 
effects of EU law on their jurisdiction – thus safeguarding the coherence of the investment law 
system – and it would also ensure that they would be perceived as a more legitimate system. 




Following the Court of Justice’s recent Achmea judgment, there is already a representative sample 
of cases in which intra-EU investment tribunals have assessed the relevance and legal effects of 
Achmea. The number of pending cases is staggering and will continue to rise, ensuring that the 
relationship between the EU legal order and Achmea, on the one hand, and the Energy Charter 
Treaty and intra-EU BITs, on the other, will remain topical in the years to come.  
Whilst Achmea is used by the Respondents or the Commission to object to the tribunals’ 
jurisdiction, tribunals have so far consistently rejected these objections and have upheld their 
jurisdiction. The reasons vary among the tribunals, but one can already observe the formation of a 
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jurisprudence constante concerning the relationship between the ECT and Achmea, the tribunals 
ignoring the applicability of the latter. Another example is the alleged non-applicability of Achmea 
in ICSID cases due to the principle of the irrevocability of consent under the ICSID Convention.  
The reasons why intra-EU tribunals uphold their jurisdiction, even when they know that their 
awards cannot be enforced in the EU, are varied. The most compelling reason seems to be the one 
evoked by the Marfin v Cyprus Tribunal. Enforceability is a separate issue from jurisdiction. Thus, 
in the jurisdictional phase a tribunal should decide based on the law in front of it, and not whether 
the decision will be enforced or complied with. 
The present situation, however, is clearly untenable. Even where some form of judicial 
dialogue exists, in the form of arbitral tribunals engaging with EU law and Achmea, the results are 
the same: intra-EU tribunals uphold their jurisdiction, render and award that is unenforceable in the 
EU, and investors then have to try enforcing the awards before third-country courts. One could 
argue that intra-EU tribunals could decline to exercise their jurisdiction in favour of EU courts (both 
national and EU level) as a sign of judicial comity. If this option is not suitable, then they could 
continue upholding their jurisdiction and then dismiss the case based on the need to ensure the 
effective administration of justice. The latter option could help intra-EU tribunals continue past 
practice relating to the effects of EU law on their jurisdiction – thus safeguarding the coherence of 
the investment law system – and it would also ensure that they would be perceived as a more 
legitimate system. Nevertheless, the likelihood that in practice they will adopt either of these 
approaches is very low. It seems that the only way the situation will be clarified is when the EU 
Member States terminate the intra-EU BITs with their sunset clauses and amend the ECT. However, 
these drastic measures will not affect pending cases.  
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Annex 1. Post-Achmea, Concluded or Pending intra-EU Investment Arbitrations 
  




1 Juvell & Bithell v. Poland ICC CY-PO BIT Concluded 2019 N/A 
2 Gavrilovic v Croatia  ICSID ARB/12/39 AT-CR BIT Concluded 2018 No 
3 Marfin v Cyprus ICSID ARB/13/27 CY-GR BIT Concluded 2018 Yes 
4 RREEF v Spain ICSID ARB/13/30 ECT Concluded 2019 Yes 
5 Antin v Spain ICSID ARB/13/31 ECT Concluded 2018 No 
6 UP and CD v Hungary ICSID ARB/13/35 FR-HU BIT Concluded 2018 Yes 
7 Masdar v Spain ICSID ARB/14/1 ECT Concluded 2018 Yes 
8 NextEra v Spain ICSID ARB/14/11 ECT Concluded 2019 N/A 
9 Sodexo v Spain ICSID ARB/14/20 FR-HU BIT Concluded 2019 N/A 
10 Alpiq v. Romania ICSID ARB/14/28 RO-CH BIT, ECT Concluded 2018 N/A 
11 B3 Croatian Courier v. Croatia ICSID ARB/15/5 CR-NL BIT Concluded 2019 N/A 
12 ENGIE v. Hungary ICSID ARB/16/14 ECT Concluded 2018 N/A 
13 A11Y v Czech Republic ICSID UNCT/15/1 UK-CZ BIT Concluded 2018 No 
14 Darley Energy v. Poland (Darley I) PCA UK-PL BIT Concluded 2018 N/A 
15 Antaris v Spain PCA No. 2014-01 DE-SK BIT, ECT Concluded  2018 No 
16 Greentech v Italy SCC 2015/095 ECT Concluded 2018 Yes 
17 Athena/Greentech v Spain SCC 2015/150 ECT Concluded 2018 Yes 
18 Austrian Investors v. Poland Ad hoc AT-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
19 ICW v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-UK BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
20 Photovoltaik v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
21 Voltaic v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
22 Europa Nova v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CY-CZ BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
23 Cypriot Investor v. Poland Ad hoc CY-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
24 Cordoba v. Spain Ad hoc ECT Pending  N/A 
25 AMF Aircraft v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT Pending  N/A 
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26 EDF v. Spain Ad hoc ECT Pending  N/A 
27 Honwood v. Poland (Darley II) ICC CY-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
28 Vattenfall v. Germany (Vattenfall II) ICSID ARB/12/12 ECT Pending  Yes 
29 Grassetto v. Slovenia ICSID ARB/13/10 SI-IT BIT Pending  N/A 
30 EVN v. Bulgaria ICSID ARB/13/17 AU-BG BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
31 MOL v. Croatia ICSID ARB/13/32 ECT Pending  N/A 
32 InfraRed v Spain ICSID ARB/14/12 ECT Pending    N/A 
33 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. 
Ltd. v. Greece 
ICSID ARB/14/16 CY-GR BIT Pending  N/A 
34 Renenergy v Spain ICSID ARB/14/18 ECT Pending    N/A 
35 United Utilities v. Estonia ICSID ARB/14/24 NE-EST BIT Pending  N/A 
36 Micula v. Romania (Micula II) ICSID ARB/14/29 SE-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
37 RWE v Spain ICSID ARB/14/34 ECT Pending    N/A 
38 Stadtwerke v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/1 ECT Pending  N/A 
39 9REN v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/15 ECT Pending  N/A 
40 KS Invest v Spain ICSID ARB/15/15 ECT Pending    N/A 
41 BayWa r.e. v Spain ICSID ARB/15/16 ECT Pending    N/A 
42 Cube Infrastructure v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/20 ECT Pending  N/A 
43 Kruck v Spain ICSID ARB/15/25 ECT Pending    N/A 
44 JGC v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/27 ECT Pending  N/A 
45 Gabriel Resources v. Romania ICSID ARB/15/31 CA-RO BIT; 
UK-RO BIT 
Pending  Yes 
46 Cavalum v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/34 ECT Pending  N/A 
47 EON v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/35 ECT Pending  N/A 
48 OperaFund v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/36 ECT Pending  N/A 
49 Silver Ridge v. Italy ICSID ARB/15/37 ECT Pending  N/A 
50 SolEs v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/38 ECT Pending  N/A 
51 STEAG v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/4 ECT Pending  N/A 
52 Belenergia v. Italy ICSID ARB/15/40 ECT Pending  N/A 
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53 Hydro Energy v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/42 ECT Pending  N/A 
54 Watkins v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/44 ECT Pending  N/A 
55 Landesbank v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/45 ECT Pending  N/A 
56 Adamakopoulos v. Cyprus ICSID ARB/15/49 CY-GR BIT;  
BLEU-GR BIT 
Pending  N/A 
57 Eskosol v. Italy ICSID ARB/15/50 ECT Pending  N/A 
58 Sun-Flower v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/17 ECT Pending  N/A 
59 Infracapital v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/18 ECT Pending  N/A 
60 Nova Group v. Romania ICSID ARB/16/19 NL-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
61 Sevilla v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/27 ECT Pending  N/A 
62 Amlyn Holding v. Croatia ICSID ARB/16/28 ECT Pending  N/A 
63 Veolia v. Lithuania ICSID ARB/16/3 FR-LV BIT Pending  N/A 
64 UniCredit Bank v. Croatia ICSID ARB/16/31 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
65 VC Holding v. Italy ICSID ARB/16/39 ECT Pending  N/A 
66 Eurus v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/4 ECT Pending  N/A 
67 ESPF v. Italy ICSID ARB/16/5 ECT Pending  N/A 
68 Rockhopper v. Italy ICSID ARB/17/14 ECT Pending  N/A 
69 Portigon v. Spain ICSID ARB/17/15 ECT Pending  N/A 
70 Magyar Farming v. Hungary ICSID ARB/17/27 UK-HU BIT Pending  N/A 
71 Elitech v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/32 CR-NL BIT Pending  N/A 
72 Raiffeisen Bank v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/34 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
73 Addiko Bank v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/37 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
74 Bank of Cyprus v. Greece ICSID ARB/17/4 CY-GR BIT Pending  N/A 
75 Bank of Cyprus Public Company 
Limited v. Greece 
ICSID ARB/17/4 CY-GR BIT Pending  N/A 
76 DCM Energy v. Spain ICSID ARB/17/41 ECT Pending  N/A 
77 Norvik Banka v. Latvia ICSID ARB/17/47  LT-UK BIT Pending  N/A 
78 Erste Group v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/49 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
79 LSG Building Solutions v. Romania ICSID ARB/18/19 ECT Pending  N/A 
80 Veolia v. Italy ICSID ARB/18/20 ECT Pending  N/A 
81 Bladon v. Romania ICSID ARB/18/30 CY-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
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82 Alverley Investments v. Romania ICSID ARB/18/30 CY-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
83 EBL v. Spain ICSID ARB/18/42 ECT Pending  N/A 
84 European Solar v. Spain ICSID ARB/18/45 ECT Pending  N/A 
85 Canepa v. Spain ICSID ARB/19/4 ECT Pending  N/A 
86 WCV v. Czech Republic PCA CY-CZ BIT Pending  N/A 
87 CSP Equity v. Spain PCA ECT Pending  N/A 




Natland v Czech Republic 
PCA No. 2013-35 CZ-NL BIT; CY-CZ BIT; 
BLEU – CZ BIT; ECT 
Pending  N/A 
90 Slot v Poland PCA No. 2017-10 CZ-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
91 Fynerdale Holdings v. Czech 
Republic 
PCA No. 2018-18 CZ-NL BIT Pending  N/A 
92 Alten v. Spain SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
93 CEF v. Italy SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
94 Green Power v. Spain  SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
95 Sun Reserve v. Italy  SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
96 FREIF Eurowind v. Spain SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
97 Triodos v. Spain SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
















Annex 2. Pre-Achmea, Concluded intra-EU Investment Arbitrations 
 
 
N Short Name Legal Ref. IIA Status Year of Decision 
1 Eastern Sugar v Czech SCC 088/2004 CZ-NL BIT Concluded 2004 
2 AES v Hungary II ICSID ARB/07/22 ECT Concluded 2010 
3 Vöcklinghaus v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT Concluded 2011 
4 Achmea v. Slovakia PCA 2008-13 NL-SK BIT Concluded 2012 
5 Electrabel v Hungary ICSID ARB 07/19 ECT Concluded 2012 
6 Euram v Slovakia PCA 2010-17 AT-SK BIT Concluded 2012 
7 Servier v Poland PCA FR-PO BIT Concluded 2012 
8 ECE v Czech Republic PCA Case No. 2010-5 CZ-GE BIT Concluded 2013 
9 Micula v Romania (I)  ICSID ARB/05/20 SE-RO BIT Concluded 2013 
10 Anglia and Busta v Czech Republic SCC CZ-UK BIT Concluded 2014 
11 Enkev Beheer v Poland PCA Case No. 2013-01 NL-PO BIT Concluded 2014 
12 Forminster v Czech Republic Ad hoc CY-CZ BIT Concluded 2014 
13 Charanne v Spain SCC 062/2012 ECT Concluded 2016 
14 Isolux v Spain SCC V2013/153 ECT Concluded 2016 
15 Seventhsun v Poland SCC CY-PO BIT Concluded 2016 
16 Busta v Czech Republic SCC Case No. 2015/014 CZ-UK BIT Concluded 2017 
17 Eiser v Spain ICSID ARB/13/36 ECT Concluded 2017 
18 Energija v Latvia ICSID ARB/12/33 LV-LT BIT  Concluded 2017 
19 Horthel v Poland PCA Case No. 2014-31 NL-PO BIT Concluded 2017 
20 JSW v Czech Republic  PCA Case No. 2014-03 CZ-GE BIT Concluded 2017 
21 WNC v Czech Republic PCA Case No. 2014-34 CZ-UK BIT Concluded 2017 
22 Novenergia v Spain SCC Arbitration 2015/063 ECT Concluded 2018 
 
